Highly Confidential - Subject to Further Confidentiality Review Case: 1:17-md-02804-DAP Doc#: 5593-36 Filed: 08/20/24 1 of 25. PageID#: 643969

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
3	EASTERN DIVISION
4	IN RE: NATIONAL *
5	PRESCRIPTION * MDL No. 2804
6	OPIATE LITIGATION * Case No.
7	* 1:17-MD-2804
8	THIS DOCUMENT RELATES * Hon. Dan A.
9	CASE TRACK 8 * Polster
10	
11	
12	
13	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO FURTHER
14	CONFIDENTIALITY REVIEW
15	
16	
17	Remote videotaped deposition of CHRIS HEWELL,
18	held via Zoom on July 25, 2023, before
19	Lois A. Robinson, Registered Diplomate
20	Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter,
21	commencing at approximately 10:03 a.m. EST
22	
23	
24	
25	

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```
Publix distributes opioids.
 1
 2
               I'm sorry. Withdraw.
               Publix distributes opioids. True?
 3
     MS. WHITE:
               Object to form.
 5
 6
     Α
               Publix -- Publix distributes opioids,
     yes.
     MR. BADALA:
 8
               When did Publix first start
 9
     distributing opioids?
10
               That would be 2005.
11
     Α
12
     Q
              What date in 2005?
               I don't have the exact date in 2005.
13
     We opened our pharmacy warehouse in 2005.
14
               As the Publix representative, you don't
15
     know the date specifically in 2005 when Publix
16
17
     started distributing opioids?
     MS. WHITE:
18
19
               Object to form.
               No. I didn't memorize the date we
     Α
20
21
     started shipping opioids.
22
     MR. BADALA:
23
              Does Publix still distribute opioids
     today?
24
25
     Α
               Yes.
```

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```
Publix has been distributing opioids in
 1
 2
     Cobb County from 2005 to the present. True?
 3
     MS. WHITE:
 4
               Object to form.
     Α
               Yes.
 5
 6
     MR. BADALA:
 7
               These opioids include oxycodone?
     Α
               I'm sorry. Was that a question?
 8
               Yes.
 9
     Q
               Can you clarify -- can you repeat the
10
     question? I'm sorry.
11
12
     Q
               Sure.
13
               I was asking you about Publix
     distributing opioids, and my follow-up question
14
     is: Those opioids include oxycodone? Is that
15
16
     true?
17
     Α
               Publix didn't begin shipping oxycodone
     until 2016.
18
19
     Q
               Does Publix still distribute oxycodone?
               Yes.
20
     Α
21
     Q
               Including in Cobb County?
     Α
               Yes.
22
23
               And those opioids also include
     hydrocodone?
24
25
     Α
               Yes.
```

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```
And what years did Publix distribute
 1
 2
     hydrocodone?
 3
     Α
               That would be 2005 to 2014, when
     hydrocodone was rescheduled, and then again in
     2016 until present.
 5
 6
               All right. Thank you.
 7
               Those opioids also include fentanyl; is
     that right?
 8
               Publix began shipping fentanyl in 2016.
 9
     A
               Publix still distributes fentanyl
10
11
     today? Is that true?
12
     Α
               Yes.
               Including in Cobb County?
13
     0
               Yes.
14
     Α
15
               Okay. I'm gonna show you another
     document. I'll mark this Exhibit 4.
16
17
               (DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NUMBER 4
18
               WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
19
     MR. BADALA:
               (Zoom distortion) quick objection
20
     quickly.
21
               Have you seen this document, "Publix
22
23
     Objections in Response to Topics 1 to 7, 22 and
     23"? Have you seen this document before?
24
25
     Α
               Can you scroll through the next pages?
```

```
Sure.
                      It's --
 1
     0
 2
     Α
               I'm sorry. Can you slow down?
 3
               Yeah, I can slow down. I can zoom out,
           I don't know what's easier for you to see.
     Α
               Yeah. If you don't mind zooming out,
 5
 6
     please.
 7
               Yeah.
                      Is that better?
     Α
               Yes.
 8
               Okay. And you're --
 9
10
               Sorry.
11
               You see it has the same topics we were
12
     discussing, and then it has some objections
13
     below, responses and objections. Did you see
     this document in preparation for your deposition?
14
15
               I see some of these topics are the ones
     that you listed here. Actually, all of them, 22
16
17
     23, and the ones we looked at in Exhibit 1.
18
     Α
               Yes.
19
               Okay. Do you see here in kind of --
               So you've seen this document before?
20
21
     Α
               Yes.
               Okay. And you see here Publix writes,
22
23
     "Rather, except for topic 9, Publix's witnesses
     will limit preparation to January 1st, 2006, to
24
25
     present"? Do you see that?
```

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```
Α
               Yes.
 1
 2
               Okay. Now you see why I was asking you
 3
     about January 1st, 2006, to the present?
 4
     Α
               Not really. Can you clarify?
               Yeah. Your -- your counsel said that
 5
 6
     you're gonna be prepared for the time period of
 7
     January 1st, 2006, to the present. See where
     your counsel wrote that, where Publix wrote it?
 8
     A
               Yes.
 9
               Are you prepared for that today?
10
11
     Α
               Yes.
12
               Okay. The law requires Publix to have
13
     a suspicious order monitoring system. True?
     MS. WHITE:
14
15
               Object to form. Object to the extent
     it calls for legal opinion or expert testimony.
16
17
               You can answer, Mr. Hewell.
               I'm sorry. Can you repeat the
18
     Α
19
     question?
     MR. BADALA:
20
21
               The law requires Publix to have a
     suspicious order monitoring system. True?
22
23
     MS. WHITE:
               Same objections.
24
25
     Α
               The DEA requires distributors to have a
```

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```
suspicious order monitoring system.
 1
 2
     MR. BADALA:
 3
               And Publix understands that that is a
     law; is that right?
     Α
               Publix understands the responsibility.
 5
 6
               And that responsibility has existed in
     the time period we're discussing of January 1st,
     2006, to the present.
 8
     A
 9
               Yes.
               And when Publix started distributing
10
     opioids in 2005, that was also the obligation;
11
12
     isn't that right?
13
     MS. WHITE:
               Object to form and scope.
14
15
               Can you repeat the question?
     Α
     MR. BADALA:
16
17
     Q
               Sure.
               Even in 2005, when Publix first started
18
19
     distributing opioids, Publix knew that it -- it
     was required to have a suspicious order
20
     monitoring system. Isn't that right?
21
               Yes.
22
     Α
23
               Having a suspicious order monitoring
     system helps prevent the diversion of opioids.
24
25
     True?
```

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```
MS. WHITE:
 1
 2
               Object to form.
 3
     Α
               I suspect the purpose of a suspicion
 4
     order monitoring system is to prevent diversion.
     MR. BADALA:
 5
 6
               And, therefore, having one, having a
     suspicious order monitoring system, helps prevent
     the diversion of opioids. True?
 8
 9
     MS. WHITE:
10
               Object to form.
11
     Α
               Yes.
12
     MR. BADALA:
               How many suspicious orders did Publix
13
     report to the DEA between January 1st, 2006, and
14
15
     the present?
16
     MS. WHITE:
17
               Object to form.
18
               I'm sorry. Repeat the question?
     Α
     MR. BADALA:
19
20
               How many suspicious orders did Publix
21
     report to the DEA between January 1st, 2006, and
22
     the present?
23
     MS. WHITE:
24
               Same objection.
25
               Sorry. Go ahead, Chris.
```

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```
1
     Α
               Give me one moment here.
 2
     MR. BADALA:
 3
               And if you're looking at something,
 4
     just kind of indicate what you're looking at so
     we can kind of follow along, please.
 5
 6
     Α
               I'm on tab 31, or A-31, of materials
     consulted.
               Okay. Sitting here today, do you know
 8
     the answer to my question?
 9
10
               Um --
     MS. WHITE:
11
12
               Object to -- object to form.
               I don't -- I don't know the total
13
14
     quantity. Give me one moment.
15
               Based on my review of tab 31 and my
16
     knowledge from reviewing Jennifer Warren's
     deposition, I believe around 150 had been
17
18
     reported in 3/2021.
19
               Okay. My question was up to the
     present. Do you know how many, including the
20
21
     present?
22
     MS. WHITE:
23
               Object to form.
               I'm aware of at least 150.
24
     Α
25
     MR. BADALA:
```

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```
All right. Withdrawn.
 1
 2
               Fair to say, based on the responses you
 3
     just gave us on behalf of Publix, that from 2006
 4
     through 2017 Publix did not report any suspicious
     orders to the DEA?
 5
 6
     Α
               During that time frame, there were no
     suspicious orders to report to the DEA.
               Therefore, Publix did not report any
 8
     suspicious orders to the DEA. Is that right?
 9
10
               That's correct.
11
     Q
              And the first suspicious order that
12
     Publix ever reports to the DEA is in 2018. Is
13
     that right?
               Yes.
14
     Α
15
               How many suspicious orders did Publix
     report to the DEA in 2005?
16
17
     A
               Publix didn't have any suspicious
     orders to report to the DEA in 2005.
18
19
               Therefore, Publix did not report any
     suspicious orders to the DEA in 2005; is that
20
21
     right?
22
               Yes.
     Α
23
              Now, out of the suspicious orders that
     you testified --
24
25
               Withdrawn.
```

```
Out of the suspicious orders that
 1
 2
     Publix testified that were reported to the DEA,
 3
     how many of those orders had to do with Cobb
 4
     County stores?
               There were no suspicious orders
 5
 6
     reported for Cobb County stores.
 7
               Throughout --
               Now, let me get the time frame so we're
 8
 9
     on the same page.
               From 2005 to the present, Publix has
10
     never reported a suspicious order for the Cobb
11
12
     County stores; is that correct?
13
               Yes, that's correct.
               And you even made a note of that in
14
15
     your -- well, the lawyers made a note of that in
     these materials -- sorry -- in your -- your
16
17
     notes, going back to Exhibit 2. Do you see that
     here, "no suspicious orders reported from Cobb
18
19
     County stores"?
     MS. WHITE:
20
21
               Objection to form.
               I'm sorry. Were you -- was that a
22
23
     question?
     MR. BADALA:
24
25
               Yeah. Do you see that on my screen
     Q
```

```
MR. BADALA:
 1
 2
               Okay. Mr. Hewell, welcome back. I had
 3
     just asked you before we went on our break about
 4
     PIMS. Do you recall that?
     Α
               Yes.
 5
 6
               Was PIMS the first suspicious order
     monitoring system used by Publix?
               PIMS was utilized to identify and flag
     Α
 8
     orders, yes.
 9
               Was there any other suspicious order
10
     monitoring system used by Publix before PIMS?
11
12
     Α
               PIMS was the technology tool, part of
13
     the suspicious order monitoring system, during
     that time.
14
15
               Okay. And what time period did Publix
     use PIMS to identify suspicious orders?
16
17
     MS. WHITE:
               Object to form.
18
19
              Can you repeat the question?
     MR. BADALA:
20
               When was the first date that Publix
21
     used PIMS to identify suspicious orders?
22
23
     A
               So PIMS was utilized at the beginning
     of our distribution, and it -- yeah. It was --
24
25
     it was from the beginning, 2005.
```

```
application?
 1
 2
     Α
              Yes.
 3
               Okay. You see here Jason mentioned
 4
     to -- sorry -- Jason explained to the DEA that
     Publix has a max -- has max ordering points? Do
 5
 6
     you see that?
 7
           Yes.
              Does this refresh Publix's recollection
 8
     about max ordering points and the PIMS system?
 9
               Yes. What Jason's referring to with
10
11
     max ordering points there is the PIMS ship max.
12
     Q
               Okay. And what was the ship max based
13
     on?
14
     A
              The ship max was a conservative maximum
15
     that was a maximum shipping amount that a
16
     pharmacy could order.
17
              So that was by store?
              At this time, it was by the
18
19
     organization.
              And when you say "the organization,"
20
21
     what do you mean by that?
22
               That was -- the ship max was set at the
23
     organization level, not the individual store
     level.
24
25
          All right. So the Publix level?
```

```
Right. Taking into consideration store
     Α
 1
 2
     utilization, yes.
 3
               Okay. I just asked you about -- we'll
     use your term now of ship max. And you were
     talking about that it was done by store for the
 5
 6
     entire -- entirety of PIMS. But looking at this
     now, is it Publix's testimony that the max
     ordering point was not by store and was, in fact,
 8
     by the Publix warehouse?
 9
     MS. WHITE:
10
               Object to form.
11
12
               So, as I mentioned, the max ordering
     Α
13
     point would take into consideration individual
     store utilization to set that ship max, and then
14
     future iterations of PIMS allowed us to set a
15
     threshold by pharmacy.
16
17
     MR. BADALA:
               When did that happen that the threshold
18
19
     could be set by pharmacy?
     Α
               That was in 2012.
20
               So before 2012, PIMS did not allow
21
     Publix to set a threshold by pharmacy.
22
23
     Α
               PIMS allowed us to set a threshold for
     all of our pharmacies, so not true.
24
25
               Okay. Before 2012 --
     Q
```

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```
Well, withdrawn.
 1
 2
               You just testified "and then future
     iterations of PIMS allowed us to set a threshold
 3
     by pharmacy." Do you recall that?
               Yes.
     Α
 5
 6
               And you said that future iteration was
     in 2012. Is that right?
     Α
               That's right.
 8
               So prior to 2012, PIMS did not allow
 9
     Publix to set up a threshold by each -- for each
10
11
     specific pharmacy. Is that right?
               I think -- I think I need some
12
     A
13
     clarification. I'm not understanding the
     question.
14
15
               Let's use Jason's terminology, these
     max ordering points that you see in the document
16
17
     before you. Do you see that?
18
     Α
               Uh-huh. Yes.
19
               That max ordering point in 2011 was not
     based on each specific Publix pharmacy. Is that
20
21
     right?
               As I mentioned, it's based on all store
22
23
     utilization to determine the max ship quantity.
               All the stores taken together. Is that
24
25
     what you're saying?
```

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```
1
     Α
               Yes.
 2
               Not specific store number -- and I'm
 3
     just making up a store number -- 1234.
 4
               That's correct. It wasn't
 5
     individualized by pharmacy.
 6
               And that was from the first date Publix
     started distributing opioids all the way up until
     about 2012. Is that your testimony today?
 8
               Yes. It would have been shortly after
 9
     Α
     this -- this DEA inspection.
10
11
               What specific date in 2012 did that
12
     change?
13
     Α
               Give me one moment, please.
14
     Q
               What document are you looking at to try
     to find that specific date?
15
16
               I'm looking at A-7. And it would have
     been in the fourth quarter of 2012.
17
18
               Going back now to P-PUB-0210, the
19
     document in front of us, Jason, he was the
     superintendent of the Orlando distribution
20
21
     center; is that right?
22
     Α
               Yes.
23
               Okay. He writes, "Tony (Zoom
     distortion) contact in getting this ball rolling?
24
25
     We would need to have some form of report that
```

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```
would be viewed by pharmacy ops and flag
 2
     suspicious orders."
 3
               Did I read that correctly?
 4
     Α
               Yes.
               And this is a document kept in the
 5
 6
     ordinary course of business at Publix?
 7
               I don't know what you mean by that.
     Can you clarify?
 8
               Sure. It's a document produced by
 9
     Publix. It's a copy of an email that was
10
     actually sent to you internally at Publix on or
11
12
     about August 1st, 2011?
13
               Yes.
               Okay. Still focusing on PIMS, once a
14
     Q
     order was flagged by PIMS, what was the next
15
16
     step?
17
               An order gets flagged by PIMS, and the
     product wasn't shipped.
18
19
               Anything else done after an order was
     flagged?
20
21
               Pharmacies and pharmacy supervisors
     were notified of the flagged order.
22
23
     0
              Anything else?
               Again, the product wasn't shipped. At
24
25
     that point, the pharmacy supervisor would
```

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```
1 determine whether or not the pharmacy potentially
```

- 2 needed a threshold increase or determine whether
- 3 or not there was activity that would warrant the
- 4 flagged order being deemed suspicious.
- 5 Q What did Publix call that process?
- 6 A I don't recall that we called -- that
- 7 we had a name for it.
- 8 Q Could we call that due diligence or
- 9 investigation of the flagged order?
- 10 MS. WHITE:
- 11 Object to form.
- 12 A We didn't specifically give it a name,
- 13 but that, you know -- we didn't -- we didn't
- 14 identify the process with anything.
- 15 MR. BADALA:
- 16 Q Okay. For the deposition today, we're
- 17 discussing that process. Can we refer to it as
- 18 the investigation into the flagged order?
- 19 MS. WHITE:
- 20 Object to form.
- 21 A I would call it part of our suspicious
- 22 ordering monitoring process.
- 23 MR. BADALA:
- 24 Q Okay. And who would perform this part
- of Publix's suspicious order monitoring process?

```
MS. WHITE:
 1
 2
               Object to form.
 3
     Α
               Can you clarify what part of this --
 4
     MR. BADALA:
               That's what I was trying to talk about.
 5
 6
     The part where you said about the pharmacy
     supervisor reviewing the order.
 8
              Okay. What was the question? I'm
 9
     sorry.
               From this time period of using PIMS,
10
     who would review the flagged order?
11
12
     Α
               So the flagged order would be sent to
13
     the pharmacy supervisor and the pharmacy manager
14
     or the pharmacy.
               How was it sent to them?
15
     0
     Α
               It was sent via email.
16
17
               Do you know what the email address was?
     MS. WHITE:
18
19
               Object to form.
               The email address for the recipients?
20
     Α
     MR. BADALA:
21
               The email address where it would come
22
23
     from.
               At one point, it would have come from a
24
25
     pharmacy CS audits email.
```

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```
And you said "from one point." So what
 1
 2
     point would that be?
 3
     Α
               I don't know if that changed at all
 4
     during the -- the process. That's the -- that's
     the mailbox that I'm aware of.
 5
 6
               Okay. What criteria did the pharmacy
     supervisor or manager use for determining whether
     the flagged order looked suspicious?
 8
               The criteria that we advised our
 9
     A
     pharmacy supervisors to review is to determine
10
     whether or not the pharmacy -- to review the
11
12
     dispensing history of the pharmacies and
13
     determine whether or not prescriptions that are
     being dispensed are suspicious.
14
15
               Or the other thing, we -- we sent out
     monthly reporting to our pharmacy supervisors to
16
17
     give them some trending report on their
     pharmacies; for example, their percentage of
18
19
     controlled prescriptions, cash pay patients,
     et cetera.
20
21
               And, then, one of the advantages that
     we have to other distributors is that we're able
22
23
     to get even more granular data, and we advised
     our pharmacies to also review manual inventory
24
25
     adjustment reports where pharmacies are making
```

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```
manual inventory adjustments, with the intent
 1
 2
     that our pharmacy supervisors are trying to
 3
     identify what a real suspicious order is; in
 4
     other words, an order that could potentially be
     diverted; right?
 5
 6
               So they're looking at some of these
 7
     metrics to determine whether or not there's
     pilferage with manual inventory adjustments.
 8
     They're looking at the dispensing activity of the
 9
     pharmacy, and they're looking at trends and how
10
     they, you know -- what their dispensing activity
11
12
     looks like compared to other pharmacies.
               Is all of that information contained in
13
     a document on your materials considered list?
14
15
     Α
               I was referencing tab 20.
               Okay. Just tab 20?
16
     0
17
     Α
               That was one document, yes. Uh-huh.
               Okay. Any other document that you just
18
19
     referenced in your answer?
     Α
               No.
20
               And it's your testimony, it's Publix's
21
     testimony that everything you just listed in that
22
     review occurred from the first date of
23
     distribution by Publix all the way until 2016?
24
25
     MS. WHITE:
```

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```
Object to form.
 1
 2
     Α
               No.
 3
     MR. BADALA:
 4
               When using the PIMS system --
               Sorry. Withdraw that.
 5
 6
               Was PIMS designed internally by Publix?
     MS. WHITE:
               Object to form. Scope.
 8
               Mr. Hewell, you can answer if you know.
 9
               I can't definitively answer that
10
     question.
11
12
     MR. BADALA:
13
               Who reviewed and approved threshold
     changes during the PIMS period?
14
               Pharmacies would request a threshold
15
     Α
     change with their pharmacy supervisors. Pharmacy
16
     supervisors would then have the approval of
17
18
     threshold changes.
19
               During the period of PIMS, was it the
     Publix policy to notify a store if it was
20
     approaching its controlled substance threshold?
21
22
               Yes, at times.
     Α
23
               Were there ever any internal audits
     conducted on PIMS?
24
25
     Α
              Can you clarify what you mean by
```

```
today?
 1
 2
               Yeah. I didn't specifically review
 3
     this document.
 4
               Okay. And do you see on the front of
     this document, this document talks about flagged
 5
 6
     order by OrderInsite, at least on page 1?
 7
               Yes.
     Α
               It talks about step-by-step
 8
     documentation on how an order is flagged and
 9
     reviewed -- is that right? -- at least on page 1?
10
11
     Α
              Sorry. I've got a really bad copy
12
     here.
13
               Okay. I can zoom in. I'm just looking
14
     at this Q1.7.1.
               This document talks about a
15
     step-by-step documentation on how an order
16
17
     flagged by OrderInsite is reviewed and cleared by
18
     a pharmacy compliance analyst. Is that right?
19
     Α
               Yes.
               It also talks about "supporting
20
     documentation is maintained in the OrderInsite
21
     system internal network drives and in a summary
22
23
     case report."
               Do you see that?
24
25
     Α
               Yes.
```

```
Α
               Yes.
 1
 2
               Okay. And nationwide, that means this
     is for all of the Publix stores, including, if it
 3
     would be on here, Cobb County stores?
               As I understand it, this is a list of
 5
 6
     all of our suspicious orders that were reported
     in that time frame.
               And if there were any suspicious orders
 8
     reported for Cobb County stores, they would have
 9
     been on this spreadsheet; is that right?
10
11
     Α
               Yes.
               And, like you testified earlier, there
12
13
     were no suspicious orders reported for a Cobb
     County store throughout the entire time that
14
     Publix has distributed opioids. Is that true?
15
               That's correct. There were no
16
17
     suspicious orders to report.
               And, therefore, none reported to the
18
19
     DEA. Is that right?
               That's correct.
20
     Α
21
               Okay. We are now -- that was marked --
     that should have been Exhibit 18. Now we're
22
23
     gonna go to 19.
              (DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NUMBER 19
24
25
               WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
```

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1	CERTIFICATE
2	
3	I do hereby certify that the above and
4	foregoing transcript of proceedings in the matter
5	aforementioned was taken down by me in machine
6	shorthand, and the questions and answers thereto
7	were reduced to writing under my personal
8	supervision, and that the foregoing represents a
9	true and correct transcript of the proceedings
10	given by said witness upon said hearing.
11	I further certify that I am neither of
12	counsel nor of kin to the parties to the action,
13	nor am I in anywise interested in the result of
14	said cause.
15	
16	
17	
18	LOIS ANNE ROBINSON, RPR, RMR
19	REGISTERED DIPLOMATE REPORTER CERTIFIED REALTIME REPORTER
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	